This study analyses a sample of 8,255 UK personal pension funds operated by 60 providers over a 30 years ' period (1980 -2009) in order to assess their short-and long-term performance and argues that it is inappropriate to evaluate pension funds using methods applied to evaluate mutual funds. We find strong evidence that pension funds outperform their Primary Prospectus Benchmarks (PPBs). However, we argue that this is because the PPBs are not challenging, and pension funds invest outside the PPBs, giving the funds the opportunity to better diversify risk. We also find that pension funds outperform T-bills in the long run, but not in the short run. We argue that this is a 'statistical' consequence of pension funds short-term tracking of the PPBs, which are more risky than T-bills. We discuss policy implications of our findings.
Introduction
The above transcript is taken from a daily U.K. cartoon, Alex, which basis its humour on portraying the selfish and cynical attitudes of fund managers in the City of London. The absence of the cartoon characters in the above quote diminishes somewhat the humour of the cartoon, but it still depicts the important issues investors depositing their savings with wealth management companies face, i.e., how is performance measured and are their savings really performing? These questions are particularly important for pension investments given that the reforms undertaken by numerous governments to induce personal responsibility of individuals for old-age provision, combined with the steady move of the pension industry towards an asset-backed structure and defied contribution nature of the pension investments make ordinary investors vulnerable to low income at retirement.
Sadly for contributors the existing evidence on pension funds' performance does not look particularly optimistic. Numerous studies document that pension funds do not perform well (e.g., Ippolito and Turner, 1987; Lakonishok et al., 1992; Thomas and Tonks, 2001; Blake et al., 2002) , and that pension fund managers have poor investment skills (e.g., Coggin et al., 1993; Blake et al. 1999 ). This evidence places pension funds and their managers in a rather unfavourable light, as they seem to perform worse than mutual funds and their managers (e.g., Henriksson, 1984; Coggin et al., 1993; Daniel et al., 1997; Bollen and Busse, 2005; Cuthbertson et al., 2008) . Is it however fair to compare the short-term performance of pension funds against that of mutual funds? Campbell and Viceira (2002) make a clear argument that long-term strategies may not be characterised by short-term gains. This paper builds upon this argument and takes another look at the pension fund performance using a sample of 8,255 personal pension funds operating in the UK between 1980 and 2009. It makes a first step towards documenting differences in compounded and annual average returns of pension funds across a wide range of investment styles, and pension fund ability to outperform T-bills and prospectus benchmarks.
The creation and transformation of the non-state pension industry has been a focal point for many countries around the world for the last few decades. The U.K. is no exception, even though the British non-state pension industry is one of the oldest and biggest in the world. Indeed, in the U.K., occupational pension provision has a longer history than state pension. Individual cases of an early form of occupational pensions have been recorded in the 13 th and 14 th centuries, although the first funded occupational pension was set up in 1743 to provide for widows of the Church of Scotland ministers.
By the 19 th century individual companies (e.g., East India Company) had started to introduce occupational pension schemes for their employees. Personal pension plans are a more modern phenomenon. They were set up by the 1986 Social Security Act and became available from July 1988. In 2001 the Welfare Reform and Pensions Act 1999 introduced stakeholder pension schemes.
In spite of the well rooted history of non-state pension provision, the occupational and the personal pension industries seem to be in distress. Participation rates have been in decline and according to the Office for National Statistics (2012) occupational pension funds had only 8.3 million and personal pension schemes had only 6 million active members in 2010. 2 This might be a temporary decline, but this also might be an indication of a deeper issue, i.e., the sensitivity of potential contributors to risks passed onto them by the defined contributions (DC). The fact that it is contributors who bear the consequences of potential bad performance by pension funds (the last few years seem to be particularly bad for the pension industry) may contribute to many individuals restraining from joining DC pension schemes.
Indeed, the pension industry has rather bad press both in the U.K. and abroad. Its performance has not been particularly impressive over the last few years 3 but research based on longer samples also shows that pension funds are not making money (e.g., Thomas and Tonks, 2001; Blake et al., 2002; Coggin et al. 2003; Antolin, 2008; Hinz et al., 2010) . In the light of this, it is interesting to ask whether the performance is really that bad.
Previous research on pension fund performance is split between papers using asset pricing based models as the method of valuation (e.g., Ippolito and Turner, 1987; Lakonishok et al., 1992; Brown et al., 1997; Blake et al., 1999; Thomas and Tonks, 2001; Blake et al., 2002) , and those using the Sharpe ratio and related measures (e.g., Antolin, 2008; Hinz et al., 2010) . Asset pricing based valuations explicitly assume that there are good proxies for the market portfolio against which funds are assessed. Sharpe ratio based valuations are typically used in cross-country comparisons as the standard deviations of returns are potentially more informative than beta related measures. Both approaches have their shortcomings.
A commonly discussed problem with asset pricing based valuation is the lack of a unique market portfolio (e.g., Jensen et al., 1972; Modigliani and Pogue, 1974; Blume and Friend, 1975; Roll, 1977; Roll and Ross, 1994; Ferson et al., 1999) . In the case of pension funds, however, there is an additional obstacle -traditional market indexes may not be appropriate proxies for the market portfolios because pension funds' portfolios contain assets that are not included in these indexes. For instance, using a FTSE index to assess the performance of all UK pension funds may not be very informative for the whole industry because only about 20% of UK personal pension funds specialise in domestic equities, and even these UK-equity funds can invest up to 20% of their assets outside the London Stock Exchange and still be classified as UK Equity funds.
Consequently, using an asset price based valuation with the FTSE as a proxy for the market portfolio is not suitable for the vast majority of funds. There is also another issue that has been commonly overlooked in the literature -in the case of pension funds it is the long-term performance, rather than average monthly, quarterly or even annual performance that matters. Asset price based models are based on arithmetic averages, and as such do not provide a correct tool to assess compounded returns.
It is not easy to address these shortcomings, but the Sharpe ratio (Roy, 1952; Sharpe 1966 ) seems a good candidate for a portfolio measure in spite of its own numerical issues (e.g., Lo, 2002) . It definitively avoids the above mentioned problems and provides a tool that allows comparison of a broad range of investment styles (e.g., Antolin, 2008 , Hinz et al, 2010 .
In this paper we assess the performance of personal pension funds operating in the UK in the period 1980-2009. We analyse 8,255 funds grouped in 30 investment sectors according to a classification of the Association of British Insurers (ABI). To provide a deep and informative analysis of the performance of the UK personal pension fund industry we apply Sharpe ratios and the related ) measures (Modigliani and Modigliani, 1997) . Using M 2 gives extra depth to the analysis.
Although there are no credible proxies for the market portfolio for each fund or a group of funds, there is information about individual funds' prospectus benchmarks. Primary
Prospectus Benchmarks (PPBs) cannot act as the market portfolios, but they offer an opportunity to assess pension funds' performance in relation to an objective, relevant, and exogenously (from the researcher's perspective) chosen benchmark used to advertise individual funds, in communication with existing contributors and to assess pension fund managers. 4 Based on available information we collected data for 369 different benchmarks. As far as we are aware, this is the first study that utilises prospectus benchmarks to assess pension fund performance and addresses the question of how challenging these benchmarks are.
Another novelty of this research is the distinction between compounded and annual returns used to assess performance. In the case of mutual funds, and other investments with easy exit, there is no immediate need to account for long-term returns. However, the situation is different when it comes to pension funds. Here the distinction between the short-term performance and the long-term performance is vital. This distinction may be further enhanced by a potential conflict of interest between fund managers (high short-term returns for the purpose of periodical reviews) and contributors (long-term savings). In this study the analysis of 'short-term' performance is based on a panel of annual observations, and of the 'long-term' performance on a cross-section of annualised compounded returns.
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We argue that if fund managers are focused on delivering good short-term performance (we use annual frequency), differences between performance based on annual and compounded returns may be observed. In particular, we conjecture that, 4 The importance of using the right benchmark has been long debated in the literature (e.g., Lakonishok et al., 1992; Blake et al., 1999; Dor and Jagannathan 2005; Chan et al., 2009) . Prospectus benchmarks have also been used by Sensoy (2009) in a study of mutual funds' performance. 5 We write short-term and long-term in inverted commas, because some funds in our sample operate for a short period only. To simplify notation in the rest of the paper we refer to the performance based on annual averages as 'short-term' and on compounded returns as 'long-term'. given that the PPBs are benchmarks of the funds' choice and funds can invest outside their PPBs, it is likely that some statistical evidence that pension funds outperform their PPBs can be found. We also argue that if a desire to outperform the PPBs ties pension funds' short-term risk-return characteristics to those of the PPBs, then pension funds may not be able to statistically outperform low volatility portfolios (e.g., T-Bills) on an annual basis. In particular, this could be expected if the PPBs are 'easy' benchmarks, i.e., they are characterised by high risk but not particularly high returns. This would also explain the weak performance of pension funds documented in the previous research based on average short-term returns. However, the situation might look different when compounded returns are used to assess performance over the funds' operational life.
Given that the last two years of the sample (i.e., 2008-2009) were particularly difficult for investors and that many funds were created during that period, we perform the analysis (i) using all the available data, i.e., the whole period 1980-2009, (ii) after the exclusion of the years of the financial crisis, i.e., using the period of 1980-2007, and (iii) over the crisis period of 2008-2009 alone.
As predicted we find that funds outperform their PPBs. We show that PPBs are not challenging benchmarks because they perform poorly in comparison with T-bills in the long-run. They also have unsatisfactory poor performance on an annual basis. We argue that the pension funds outperform their PPBs because the funds invest in assets not included in their PPBs which gives an opportunity to better diversify risk.
Even though pension funds outperform the PPBs they are not so uniformly good at outperforming T-bills and earning risk adjusted returns (measured by the Sharpe ratio) when annual average returns are used. Indeed, only funds specialising in emerging markets equities have statistically positive Sharpe ratios. This result is preserved when the analysis is restricted to 1980-2007. Using the compounded returns gives a more optimistic picture. Here, funds of all investment styles save for those specialising in UK equity have statistically significantly positive excess returns and Sharpe ratios. These results are largely confirmed when the financial crisis period is excluded from the analysis. The biggest difference is detected for the UK equity funds, who this time outperform T-bills and have statistically significant Sharpe ratios, and fixed income funds, who on average perform worse than T-bills in nominal and risk adjusted terms.
The analysis of the period of the financial crisis, i.e., [2008] [2009] , confirms big differences between the performance based on the annual returns and on the compounded returns. None of the performance measures based on annual returns are statistically different from zero, while the vast majority of the performance measures based on the compounded returns are statistically significantly different from zero at 1%. There are, however, strong differences across the performance measures, investment styles, and cohorts. Interestingly, it seems that the UK-equity funds perform worse.
These results have important implications for future research, pension contributors and policy design. The paper opens a new and fresh look at the pension industry, and, in particular, on the complexity of the assessment of performance and choice of benchmarks. It also offers the first rigorous assessment of the performance of the personal pension industry. It assesses the performance of a broad range of investment styles, including fixed income investments, which are commonly included in pension saving portfolios, and fast growing overseas equity investments. The research documents the importance of benchmark choice and its potentially misleading role in achieving good long-term performance. It brings to the fore the question of greater scrutiny of the process of opening new pension funds and monitoring their subsequent performance evaluation.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 summarises the literature and formulates hypotheses for the empirical analysis. Section 3 describes the dataset. Section 4 provides basic descriptive statistics of risk -return characteristics of the pension funds, PPBs and T-bills. Section 5 presents and discusses the results of the regression analysis. It defines and discusses funds' performance measures and presents the results of the cross-section and of the panel analyses. Section 6 concludes and outlines a few directions for future research.
Literature review and hypotheses
Pension fund performance seems to be more widely discussed in practitioners' circles than among academics. Understandably, practitioners, both regulators and funds themselves, are very interested in assessing how the industry evolves, develops and performs. On one hand such assessment is crucial in evaluating the existing regulatory regimes and investment practices to inform on directions and scale of future reforms. On the other hand, fund managers' remuneration and, potentially career, may hinge on how funds perform and how the industry develops. All this is particularly stimulated by the fast paced process of the industry becoming asset-backed.
The academic world seems more focused on assessing performance of the mutual fund industry than of the pension fund industry. Being less regulated than the pension fund industry, the mutual fund industry offers rich material to assess the investment skills of fund managers (e.g. Henriksson, 1984; Coggin et al., 1993; Daniel et al., 1997; Bollen and Busse, 2005; Cuthbertson et al., 2008) , test for potential departures from the EMH (Brown and Goetzmann, 1995; Carhart, 1997; Blake and Timmermann, 1998; Davis J.L., 2001; Bollen and Busse, 2005; Cuthbertson et al., 2008) , and examine practices of wooing investors (Cooper et al., 2005; Massa, 2003; Sensoy, 2009 performance is rather poor (e.g., Ippolito and Turner, 1987; Lakonishok et al., 1992; Ambachtsheer et al., 1998; Blake et al., 1999 and Blake et al.; 2002) , and pension funds' managers are not particularly skilled (Coggin et al., 1993; Blake et al., 1999; Thomas and Tonks, 2001 ).
It is interesting, however, that all the assessment of the pension industry is conducted using the same statistical and econometric methods that are used for assessing mutual fund performance. This is surprising because, as Campbell and Viceira (2002) point out, even within the risk-return framework of Markowitz long-term and short-term optimal portfolios do not have to be the same. Consequently, short-term performance of longterm optimal portfolios may be quite unflattering, even if their long-term performance is good.
Therefore, to give pension funds fair assessment and pension fund investors informative appraisal of the value of their contributions it is important to assess pension funds' performance over the long horizon. This, however, does not mean that annual performance of pension funds' investments is irrelevant, e.g., pension fund managers are subject to frequent reviews, which may potentially result in a conflict of interest between short-term oriented managers and long-term oriented contributors. Therefore, assessing short-term performance may shed some lights on our understanding whether pension managers' investment practices benefit them, contributors or both. In other words, evaluation of both the long-term and the short-term performance is important. Hence, statistical techniques which allow for such valuations and a meaningful comparison are needed.
Asset pricing methods are not suitable for assessing long-term performance as they operate on arithmetic (average) and not geometric returns. Moreover, a high proportion of pension funds are multi-asset class investments. While it is common to focus on mutual funds investing in domestic equities, restricting an analysis to pension funds only investing in domestic equities would be a strong limitation and, indeed, a mistake. This is because 'pure' equity pension investments are rare. For instance, the U.K.'s NEST programme promotes portfolios that combine fixed income security investments with higher risk asset classes as a default option which is set universally with expectations that individuals will hardly ever change them themselves, but the proportions of portfolios' invested in fixed income securities will be 'automatically' modified with age of contributors. 6 In addition, even if contributors deliberately choose to invest in equity funds only, it does not mean that 100% of contributors' monies will be invested in equity. According to the ABI classification of investment styles funds are classified as equity if at least 80% of their AUM are allocated in equity. In other words, an equity fund can have up to 20% of their assets allocated outside the main ABI classification asset class.
Given that CAPM-like techniques of performance assessment are not suitable for the pension industry alternative measures are required if one wishes to obtain a full and comprehensive picture of its performance. The Sharpe ratio, and related to it the M 2 measure, are natural candidates. However, M 2 requires a 'reference point' against which the performance is to be assessed.
When issuing prospectuses to attract contributors the UK pension funds specify the, so called, Primary Prospectus Benchmark (PPB), which is subsequently used as a reference point when reporting their performance. Although PPBs cannot act as the market portfolios, they offer an opportunity to assess pension funds' performance in relation to an objective, relevant, and exogenously (from the researcher's perspective) chosen benchmark.
Given, that PPBs are used in short-term portfolio evaluations, it can be expected that funds will have a strong incentive to outperform them. 7 Preferably, the outperformance would be achieved by high investment skills, e.g., good selection, timing, etc. However, the past research suggests that this may not necessarily be the case (e.g., Henriksson, 1984; Coggin et al., 1993; Daniel et al., 1997; Bollen and Busse, 2005; Cuthbertson et al., 2008) . Therefore, if managers have any say in what they wish their fund performance to be compared against, they may choose an 'easy' benchmark. If this is the case, the outperformance of the benchmarks could be achieved by: (i) constructing portfolios more risky than their PPBs and/or (ii) diversification using assets external to the PPBs.
Without detailed information about portfolio allocation it is impossible to test which of the above possibilities is true, however a comparison of the pension fund performance against the T-bills could potentially shed some light on the issue. If the PPBs are challenging, then pension funds' performance measured against the T-bills should be better than when measured against the PPBs in the long-run, i.e., when the compounded returns are used in the performance analysis. The short-term performance, i.e., based on annual returns, may not be informative. This is because if pension funds are focused on outperforming their PPBs in the short-run, and their risk is at least as big as that of their PPBs, the differences between the returns on funds and on the T-bills may have high volatility. Consequently, obtaining statistical significance for these differences may be hard, or even impossible in the short-run. In other words, it is the long-term, not shortterm, performance analysis that can inform whether the PPBs are tough or easy benchmarks.
Data
We have collected data for 10,086 funds operated by 63 providers from the UK Life and Pension database by Morningstar Direct™ which include the fund's inception date, 7 At this point we do not discuss whether pension funds outperform benchmarks because they choose successful strategies to beat PPBs or whether the choice of PPBs is endogenous to a chosen investment strategy.
provider, classification of its investment sector according to the ABI, and monthly returns from January 1980 till December 2009. property, specialist, and protected/guaranteed funds. These sectors are put together because there are relatively few funds in each of these categories (all together they form only 8.6% of the sample), and to focus our attention on the main investment styles.
Details of the grouping are provided in Appendix 1. It should be mentioned at this point, that the ABI sector classification is based on the, so-called, primary investment focus.
For example, a fund classified as I-E may still invest up to 20% of its assets outside its primary classification group i.e., I-E funds can invest in the UK-E, FI, EM-E, etc. ******************* insert Table 1 here *********************
To provide a better feel of the sample, Figure 1 shows the numbers of funds in each of the six investment styles (with EM-E, I-E and UK-E combined into Equity) that Almost half of these institutions started offering personal pension funds in the 1980s and by the early 1990s 45 out of the 63 were already active.
In addition to information about the characteristics of the funds we have also collected information on the Primary Prospectus Benchmark (PPB) for individual funds.
Having the information about the PPBs is essential for evaluation of performance and understanding the informative power of the PPBs.
This however comes at a price. Out of the 10,086 funds that report monthly returns only 8,255 have information for at least six months which we take as a minimum amount of observations to assess performance. Table 1 Panel B shows the numbers of funds and observations for this sample. We refer to it as the 'PPB-Unrestricted' sample to contrast it with the 'PPB-Restricted' sample, summarised in Table 1 Panel C. The PPB-Restricted sample consists of funds, for which complete information about the PPB was available, i.e., it consists of funds for which we were able to reconstruct the PPB, and collect monthly prices to calculate relevant statistics. All PPB price information has been collected from DataStream. Out of 515 different benchmarks appearing in the PPBUnrestricted sample we were able to reconstruct and calculate monthly performance for 369 benchmarks. 
Risk -return characteristics
The first issue is how to measure multi-period fund returns. This supposedly trivial question has been long debated since both using arithmetic and geometric (compounded) returns have merits as well as short-comings.
From a contributor's perspective it is important how much money has been earned over the period of contribution, especially since pension funds, in contrast with other common forms of investment, make earlier withdrawals costly. 10 Given the reinvested nature of the pension investments the compounded returns seem most suitable.
However, because the operational lives of the pension funds included in the sample differ significantly (some funds operate for over 20 years, some for two years only), the total compounded return cannot be compared across funds. Therefore, the 'long-term' returns are calculated as the annualised geometric mean of monthly returns, and are 9 Among 515 benchmarks 389 were individual market indexes and 126 were composite benchmarks. Most commonly we could not reconstruct benchmarks because the weights of composite indexes were not provided, and/or their names were not recognised by DataStream. 10 Blake (2003) claims that if a personal scheme was terminated after only one year, a contributor might lose as much as 90% of his/her contributions.
referred to as annualised compounded returns (ACRs). The annualised standard deviation of the monthly returns is used as a measure of risk.
Unlike contributors, fund managers may be more interested in short-term performance given that their performance and remuneration are typically reviewed on a short-term basis. To account for it we also calculate yearly returns (YRs) as compounded monthly returns over each calendar year. If a fund operated for less than six months in a given calendar year (i.e., opened in a period July-December), these first few months are not included into the analysis. First year returns of funds opened between January-June are annualised. The focus is on yearly (not quarterly) returns, because annual reports carry more weight than quarterly reports, to avoid further annualisation, and to minimise issues with time-series properties in the panel analysis.
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Risk of the YRs is calculated as the standard deviation of monthly returns in the corresponding calendar year. ******************* insert Table 2 here ********************* These simple statistics show that on average pension funds' YRs are over 2% higher than the YRs of their PPBs in every period and sample considered. At the same time on average the YRs of the PPBs tend to be lower than YRs of the T-bills. The ACRs' statistics also show that the pension funds on average earn higher returns than their
PPBs, but the PPBs do not consistently outperform T-bills.
In more detail, in the 1980-2009 period the difference between the funds' average YRs and the average T-bills' YRs was only 0.39%, and this is before risk (much higher for the funds than for the T-bills) is accounted for. Slightly better results are obtained when the two years of the financial crisis are excluded from the analysis. Here funds outperform the T-bills by 3% in ACRs and 2.38% in YRs. These differences are also statistically significantly different from zero at 1%. However, the returns of the PPBs are not particularly impressive. Although, the PPBs' ACRs are 6.15% in comparison with 5.33% of the T-bills (the difference is statistically significant at 1%), their YRs are only 0.07% higher than the YRs of the T-bills.
To Table 2 . 12 ******************* insert Figure 2 here *********************
The separation into the investment styles shows that the statistics reported in Table 2 are not driven by any particular style. With an exception of the 1980-2007 period it is common for funds of all the investment styles to have the higher average return than their PPBs but very similar risk, i.e., the diamonds indicting the location of the funds' averages are practically vertically above, and occasionally to the left of, the dots of the PPBs' averages. 13 The crisis period is no exception. Whether the funds are created 12 We do not present the corresponding YRs graphs to save space. They are twin-similar to the presented ones. 13 T-tests for the hypothesis that the population of the standard deviations of the funds and of their PPBs have the same mean could not be rejected for the entire sample and for all ABI investment styles but the FI and the I-E funds. However, although the I-E and the FI funds were statistically significantly more risky than their PPBs, the differences themselves were very small: σ(I-E) = 103.28% while σ(PPB I-E ) = 101.78%, and σ(FI) = 37.52% while σ(PPB FI ) = 34.66%.
before 2008 or during and after 2008 has an impact on their average returns and risk (the younger funds are on average less risky and more profitable than the old ones), but not on their relative position against their benchmarks. This means that judging with a naked eye, funds may statistically outperform their benchmarks in absolute and relative terms, i.e., fund managers beat the 'market' at a quite comfortable margin.
In contrast, the exclusion of the 2008-2009 period shows a more familiar picture, that is the funds earn, on average, higher returns but they also risk more (except for the FI funds). To gain further insight into the performance of the funds we now compare various performance measures.
Performance measures
The performance of pension funds, as with any other funds, is always relative to some benchmark. However, what the appropriate benchmark should be is not always easy to answer. It is common in the literature to measure funds' returns in relation to returns on a leading stock market index (Lakonishok et al., 1992) or construct benchmarks using indexes for asset classes included in the portfolios (Blake et al, 1999) .
The first method is not appropriate for funds investing outside the domestic equity market. The second method requires detailed information about asset classes included in the portfolios, and additional testing to ensure that those constructed benchmarks satisfy the requirements of the market portfolio (they are at least efficient) if to be used in a CAPM-like setting. None of these approaches is suitable for our data, first because funds investing in other asset classes than UK-listed equity constitute a high proportion of funds under consideration, second, no information about asset classes is available, and third, the interest is in compounded returns.
The first benchmark we use is a T-bill rate. Short-term interest rates are not risk free for long-term investments because of uncertainty of reinvestment rates, but truly longterm investment rates are not available to 'ordinary' individual UK investors. Average retirement savings last about 40 years, with a further 20 years of cashing them through retirement, yet the supply of 40 years' bonds to individual investors is practically close to zero. Moreover, unlike in many countries in Continental Europe it is very rare for British individual investors to purchase government bonds. Therefore, although not totally risk-free, we compare pension fund performance with 'rolling-over' investments in UK T-bills. More precisely, the first measure is the excess return over the T-bill, hereafter denoted as R-Tbill. This measure, does not control for risk of any type, and therefore can be criticised for its simplicity. However, given that many investors may not understand the importance of risk adjustment and it is 'bare' returns that they appreciate, we include this measure in the analysis.
The second measure is the difference between the fund return and that of its PPB, hereafter denoted as R-PPB. This measure is not risk adjusted either, but provides a relevant comparison with the benchmark of the fund's choice for comparison in performance reports.
The third measure is the M 2 introduced by Modigliani and Modigliani (1997) . It adjusts the fund's return to the benchmark's risk. Although the M 2 is not without criticism (Goetzmann et al., 2007) it serves well as the direct risk-adjusted comparison of the fund performance against the performance of its PPB.
The last measure is the Sharpe ratio, denoted later as SR, which has widespread applications in fund industries (Goetzmann et al., 2007; Eling, 2008; Antolin, 2008 , Hinzetal et al, 2010 and directly adjusts funds' returns for their volatility and the riskfree rate (here proxied by the T-bills). Given that T-bills are not totally risk free we also defined the Sharpe ratio using standard deviation of R-Tbills rather than of R (e.g., Lo, 2002) . The results are practically identical which is consistent with the fact that the volatility of the annual fund returns is much higher than the annual volatility of the Tbills. We do not present these results, but they can be obtained from the authors on request. The distributions of the M 2 and the two Sharpe ratios have been 0.5% winsorized at both tails (Wilcox, 2005) in order to deal with outliers for observations where the denominator was close to zero.
We start the analysis from a series of simple regressions, i.e., for each of the six investment styles each of the four performance measures is run against a constant. (Hoechle, 2007) , which calculates Driscoll-Kraay standard errors (Driscoll and Kraay, 1998) for unbalanced panels, is used in the fixed-effects panel regressions to control for heteroscedasticity, autocorrelation, and spatial correlation.
period. The results shown in Panels A and C are based on the PPB-Restricted sample,
and Panels B and D show the results using the PPB-Unrestricted sample. Each panel
shows the results for all the funds pooled together (ALL), and then for each investment style separately.
******************* insert Table 3 here ********************* These results suggest that, in contrast with previous research, we find evidence of outperformance. This is, however, in the long run. The size of these returns differs significantly across the investment styles, but on average it is about 2.2% above T-bills and their PPBs, which is still better than annual fees. 15 There are two issues, however, that seem potentially controversial, one is the poor performance of the funds specialising in UK equity, and the second one is the consistent outperformance of PPBs. We discuss them in turn.
UK Equity Funds
To some extent the poor performance of the UK-E funds in comparison with the potentially more diversified equity portfolios such as I-E and EM-E could be expected.
However, it seems a bit puzzling that the UK-E funds cannot outperform T-bills. One could suspect that the meltdown of the London Stock Exchange at the end of the sample period could contribute to this weak performance. To test whether this is the case we repeat regressions dropping the last two years of observations, i.e., the performance of funds is measured over 1980-2007. Table 3B shows the results (the format of Table 3A is preserved). The general pattern of statistical significance is preserved, i.e., with an exception of the EM-E funds, the YR coefficients are positive and statistically significant for R-PPB and M 2 , and the coefficients estimated for R-Tbill and SR are not statistically significant but those for EM-E. The ACR regressions' coefficients are 15 Typical fees are in order of 1%-1.8%.
statistically significant (with a few exceptions, and occasional significance dropping to 10%) for all four performance measures.
The major difference is in the size and sign of the estimated coefficients, and the significance of the coefficients estimated for T-bill and SR for the UK-E funds on the compounded basis. When the 2008-2009 period is excluded from the estimations, the UK-E funds outperform T-bills by 2.848% per annum. This is still less than the outperformance of the I-E funds and the EM-E funds that on average outperform T-bills by 4.338% and 26.69% respectively. The EM-E funds also have SR over four times the size of the SR estimates for the I-E and the UK-E funds.
Given that the 2008-2009 period is so detrimental for the overall performance the regressions are repeated for that period only. To make the comparison of the performance across the periods meaningful the regressions are first run on the sample of funds used for the regressions presented in Table 3B, (Table 3C) have the highest underperformance of T-bills (-8.7% per annum), and those created during the crisis (Table 3D ) also struggle to outperform T-bills (R-Tbill is statistically significantly different from zero at 10%, and SR is the lowest among all the investment styles). The UK-E are also the only investment style which failed to outperform their PPBs.
This evidence indicates that, funds specialising in UK equity may have been the least attractive form of long term investment. Table 4 shows results of regressions similar to those presented in Table 3 but this time the returns on the PPBs are used to calculate the ACR and the YR. More specifically, Table 4 shows the results of regressions using the difference between returns on PPBs and on the T-bills (PPB-Tbills), and the Sharpe Ratios ( ******************* insert Table 4 here *******************
The results of Table 4 As argued the performance of funds should be assessed using compounded returns, not the annual averages. The same applies to the PPBs. Therefore, the lack of statistical significance reported in Table 4 Panel B can be expected given that the PPBs are typically more risky than T-bills. However, the statistically significant underperformance of the fixed income benchmarks is concerning. The fixed income benchmarks can be expected to have low risk, and among all the investment styles to be closest to T-bills in their risk-return characteristics. Yet, they statistically significantly underperform. All this evidence suggests that the PPBs can hardly be classified as
challenging. Yet, the question remains, how is it possible that the pension funds systematically outperform them?
In Section 2 we proposed that the pension funds may successfully outperform their PPBs because they are more risky than PPBs and/or invest in assets not included in their
PPBs. 
T-tests for the hypothesis that the population of the standard deviations of the funds and of their
PPBs have the same mean could not be rejected for the entire sample and for all ABI investment styles but the FI and the IE funds. However, although the IE and the FE funds were statistically significantly more risky than their PPBs, the differences themselves were very small: σ(IE) = 103.28% while σ(PPB IE ) = 101.78, and σ(FI) = 37.52% while σ(PPB FI ) = 34.66%.
There is no information about individual assets allocation, asset classes or even markets the funds invest in, so it seems impossible to test which of these hypotheses, or both, are correct. However, the UK-E funds can help shed some light on investment practices that allow pension fund managers to maintain an average 2% or so outperformance of their PPBs.
The UK-E funds have to invest at least 80% of their AUM in equities listed on the LSE, and the fact that their PPBs are LSE equity indexes (about 86% of the UK-E funds are benchmarked to the FTSE ALL Share Index) suggests that the funds portray themselves as investors specialising in the LSE-traded equity. Figure 2B shows that on average, the UK-E funds were more risky than the PPBs before 2008. Based on this evidence we cannot categorically prove that the UK-E funds' ability to outperform the FTSE results from investing outside FTSE or not. However, one could argue that even if the FTSE does not satisfy all the theoretical assumptions of the CAPM market portfolio, it is rather unlikely that it is on average at least 2% below the efficient frontier on which the market portfolio should sit. Therefore, it is more likely that the UK-E funds invest a considerable fraction of the AUM in assets other than stocks listed on the LSE, and this diversification outside the main ABI specialisation classification allows them to formally outperform the PPB.
Whether this explanation is correct or not, the implication of funds having statistically insignificantly different risk from the FTSE but earning higher returns is that having the FTSE as the proxy for the market portfolio while assessing fund performance using a CAPM-based approach is inappropriate.
Robustness Tests
To complete the analysis we test whether providers' characteristics explain some of the observed outperformance, i.e., whether within each investment style providers are relatively homogeneous. The Morningstar Direct TM database provides information on who is the provider of each fund. Using this information we constructed the following provider characteristics on a monthly basis: size, share in each ABI sector, and degree of specialisation in each ABI sector. The previous calendar year statistics (i.e., a first lag) of the Size, Share-in-ABI and ABI-share variables in the panel regressions are adopted to side-step a potential problem that funds' performance over a given period of time may be related to the absolute and relative size, and/or specialisation of the provider. Tables 5 and Table 6 show the regression results for each investment style using performance measures based on the ACRs and the YRs respectively. Each Table   consists Controlling for providers' characteristics makes a few constants statistically insignificant in the ACRs regressions meaning that the outperformance we observed is not uniform. Interestingly, it is more common for funds of all the investment styles to outperform their PPBs than the T-bills. Indeed, out of the six investment styles it is only EM-E that have positive and statistically significant constants for R-Tbill and SR. This result is preserved when the shorter time period is used in the analysis, i.e., financial crisis is excluded, (Panel B). It is not however entirely clear what provider characteristics are associated with good performance. The key controls switch sign depending on whether the performance is measured over 1980-2009 or over 1980-2007. For instance, the results presented in Panel A suggest that bigger and more specialised providers perform better, and also more competition is beneficial. In contrast, Panel B regressions show that these results are not stable, e.g., several regressions have statistically significantly negative coefficients for Size, but positive for Share-in-ABI.
******************* insert Table 5 here *********************
The regressions estimated for the annual performance measures once more confirm that size, concentration and specialisation have some explanatory power within each investment style. Again the results are very sensitive to whether the financial crisis is included in the analysis or not indicating that more research is needed to understand the link between fund providers' characteristics and performance.
******************* insert Table 6 here *********************
Summary and Conclusions
This The results reveal an interesting picture. In contrast with the previous research, we find that pension funds may be performing better than previously reported. We document that on average pension funds outperform their PPBs in nominal and risk adjusted terms both on an annual basis (short-term) and in the long-run (compounded returns). We also find that on average pension funds outperform T-bills (in nominal and in risk adjusted terms) in the long-run. On average, on an annual basis pension funds' compounded returns are 1.822% higher than those of T-bills with funds specialising in emerging markets equity earning as much as 14.807% above the T-bill rate. This means that if annual fees are about 1%-1.5% contributors are still left with a bit more than an investment in T-bills would deliver.
The short-term performance analysis based on annual returns shows that on average pension funds outperform their PPBs but do not outperform T-bills, except for funds specialising in emerging markets equity for which we obtain statistically positive Sharpe ratios,. This is an important result. It shows that the analysis of the performance of pension funds using average annual returns may be misleading and even unfair. This is because if in the short-run pension funds target to be at least as good as their PPBs, i.e., to some extent mimic risk-return characteristics of their assigned benchmarks, then the lack of statistical significance of the annual excess returns will result from high risk differentials between the PPBs and the T-bills. However, in the long-run, i.e., when compounded returns over the period of pension fund's operation are accounted for, these differences in risk get diluted and pension fund performance in comparison with T-bills may improve. Therefore, only a long-term performance analysis can show whether the pension funds, as long-term investors, earn positive excess returns or not.
The long-term analysis is also essential for assessing how challenging the PPBs are.
Given that pension funds can diversify outside their PPBs may help them with little effort to deliver superior outperformance of their benchmarks on an annual basis. This would not be an issue itself if the long-term performance of the PPBs was good.
However, if the long-term performance of the PPBs is poor, then outperforming them in the long-run may still make the pension funds look poor in comparison with T-bills. Our analysis shows that the compounded returns of the PPBs, before and after risk adjustment, do not outperform T-bills, across all investment styles but emerging market equity and, to a weaker extent, international equity. This suggests that the PPBs are not a real challenge in the long-run, as they are not in the short-run.
To test the robustness of our findings we split the sample into the pre financial crisis Table 1 . Summary statistics for all funds (ALL) and in separation for individual investment styles (ALC-allocation; FI-fixed income; EM-E-emerging equity; I-Einternational equity, UK-E -UK equity; Other-denotes all styles not included in the above styles). Panel A: shows statistics for all funds downloaded from the Morningstar Direct TM . Panel B: PPB-Unrestricted sample shows the statistics for all the funds for which information on returns for at least six months was available. Panel C: PPBrestricted sample shows the statistics for all the funds for which information on their PPB returns was available. 1980-2009 1980-2007 2008-2009 1980-2009 1980-2007 2008-2009 Table 6A . Regressions of the PPB-restricted sample for the1980-2009 period. The performance measures are based on annual returns. ALC refers to allocation funds, FI to fixed income funds, EM-E -emerging markets funds, I-E -international funds, UK-E -UK equity funds and Others are all other investment funds not included in the previous styles. P-values are shown in parenthesis. ***: 1% significance; **: 5% significance and *: 10% significance. Table 6B . Regressions of the PPB-restricted sample for the1980-2007 period. The performance measures are based on annual returns ALC refers to allocation funds, FI to fixed income funds, EM-E -emerging markets funds, I-E -international funds, UK-E -UK equity funds and Others are all other investment funds not included in the previous styles. P-values are shown in parenthesis. ***: 1% significance; **: 5% significance and *: 10% significance. 
